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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES

October Term, 1946.

No.....

MARION M. AMATO, individually and doing business as
M. AMATO & SON, PETITIONER.

vs.

PAUL A. PORTER, Administrator, Office of Price Ad-
ministration, RESPONDENT.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States:

The petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued
to review the judgment of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit entered October 26, 1946.

JURISDICTION.

The judgment to be reviewed was entered October 26,
1946. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Judicial
Code, Section 240(a), 43 Stat. 938, 28 USCA, Sec. 347(a).

SUMMARY STATEMENT.

The Petitioner, an individual, is a wholesale distributor of bananas in Denver, Colorado. The Administrator prosecuted this action against him in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado for treble damages for violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended. The action was prosecuted on evidence obtained by the Administrator from records which the petitioner was required to keep under the regulations of the Administrator and which were seized by the Administrator under subpoena duces tecum after petitioner gave notice of his claim of privilege against self-incrimination as provided for in the said Act. The District Court over-ruled Petitioner's motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss and entered judgment against Petitioner which decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.

QUESTION PRESENTED.

When Congress includes an immunity provision in a statute empowering the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration to establish record-keeping regulations can the Administrator subject an individual to a penalty based on evidence obtained by subpoena after specific claim of privilege under the statute?

Counsel believes this question to be one of first impression before this Court.

REASONS RELIED ON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has decided a Federal question (to-wit, an important question of federal constitutional law) which has not been, but should be settled, by this Court and by its opinion has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision, in that:

1. Claim of privilege and immunity from prosecution, as specifically granted by the statute on which this action by the government is based, is disregarded

by the Circuit Court contrary to the Congressional Act and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

2. Unless the inclusion of the immunity statute in the Act on which this action is predicated means exactly as its words purport to mean then such does not serve the congressional purpose of making available to the government evidence that otherwise could not be got because of the privilege of silence conferred by the Fifth Amendment prior to the institution of the policy of Congress of incorporating an immunity statute in regulatory acts. Thus, a congressional policy of over 54 years is being thrust aside.

3. The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit extends the application of the "quasi-public record doctrine" beyond its prior application by this Court and creates a precedent and formula on which to wipe out the protection against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

CONCLUSION.

For these reasons it is respectfully submitted that this petition should be granted.

HAROLD TAFT KING,
720-23 Majestic Building,
Denver, Colorado,
Attorney for Petitioner.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

I.

THE OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (R.33) is not as yet reported. The opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (R.23) is reported in 60 F. Supp. 361.

II.

JURISDICTION.

The judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on October 26, 1946. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Judicial Code, Section 240(a), 43 Stat. 938, 28 USCA, Sec. 347(a) as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.

III.

STATUTES INVOLVED.

The statutes involved are set forth in the appendix, *infra*, pages 11, 12 and 13.

IV.

STATEMENT.

We adopt the summary statement in the Petition and to give a sufficiently full and clear statement of the case for present purposes add:

The facts are undisputed that Petitioner made claim of privilege at the time the records on which this action is based were first demanded of him (R.22); that he reiterated his claim of privilege when called before the Administrator and produced the records in compliance with subpoena duces tecum (R.10, 11, 12), and at the time he testified under oath concerning the same (R.14, 15, 16, 20, 21); that the Administrator possessed no evidence of violation of the Act by Petitioner and after obtaining Petitioner's records the Administrator filed his complaint for treble damages under the Section 205(e) of the Act (R.1) to which complaint Petitioner interposed a motion to dismiss (R.7) and motion to

suppress evidence (R.8) on the ground the action was taken in contravention of Section 202(g) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, and the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893. The District Court overruled the motions (R.23) on the ground the records are quasi-public in character and Petitioner's answer reiterated his claim immunity (R.28).

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed (R.33) the judgment of the District Court, on the grounds that the records were public records and the action is remedial and not penal in character and the immunity granted by the Fifth Amendment does not apply.

V.

SPECIFICATION OF ERROR.

That the Circuit Court of Appeals erred:

1. In affirming the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado overruling Petitioner's motion to dismiss and suppress evidence and holding that Petitioner was not entitled to immunity from prosecution of this action contrary to the provisions of Section 202(g) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended and the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893, in violation of Petitioner's rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

2. In entering judgment against Petitioner.

VI.

ARGUMENT.

The Congress, to assure the constitutionality of Section 202(b) of the Emergency Price Control Act (vesting the Administrator with the authority to require the keeping of records by those engaged in business and permit inspection by the Administrator) as not violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, followed it with the immunity statute. *Counselman v. Hitchcock*, 142 U.S. 547:

"We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution

after he answers incriminating questions put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. . . . In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates.”

And properly, as the penalty imposed by the treble damage section 205(e) of the Act comes within the intentment of the Fifth Amendment, as stated in *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616:

“As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal procedures for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

But the Circuit Court of Appeals has held (R.35, 36) that this type of action for the imposition of sanctions is remedial and not penal in nature and the immunity granted by the Fifth Amendment does not come into play. Yet if the privilege does not extend to the present action, incriminating testimony has been elicited from the Petitioner by subpoena after claim of privilege which would enable his conviction in a criminal case based on evidence obtained in this proceeding. If this be so, the protection guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is an empty shell.

The language of the Act is plain. The Congress, by including the immunity provision (Section 202(g)), with the record-keeping provision (Section 202(b)) of the Act intended that immunity should be granted to the individual specifically claiming it in order to constitutionally make available to the Administrator the information he sees fit to require in administering or enforcing the provisions of the Act.

The "Public Records Doctrine" as first enunciated by this Court in *Wilson v. United States*, 221 U.S. 361, 380, supports the statutory authority granted the Administrator to require the keeping of records by one engaged in business and the right of an enforcement agency of the government to seize such records, by subpoena if the need requires—but the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals extends this doctrine (R.34, 35) to include the prosecution of a criminal action or one for a penalty based on such records despite claim of privilege having been interposed by an individual prior to the Administrator receiving such records. Thus the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals overcomes the constitutional grant of immunity in the Fifth Amendment as reiterated by Congress in the very act (Sec. 202 (g)) under which this action is brought. We feel the "public record" cases bear solely on the question of search and seizures. That is, they are precedent for the right of the Administrator to obtain these records. Having obtained them—in the face of a claim of privilege—he cannot prosecute a criminal action or one for a penalty based on such records. The Administrator had the option to reject the evidence and deny the immunity or to receive it and thereby grant the immunity.

The decision of the Circuit Court is also based on the ground that the liability imposed by Section 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act is not a criminal penalty or forfeiture but is a civil and remedial sanction. We reply that the constitutional privilege against self incrimination is not dependent upon the nature of the proceeding but on its purpose. There can be no question but that it was the intention of the Congress, in passing this Act providing for treble damages and giving the right of action to the government to collect it, to exact a penalty as punishment for violation of regulations issued pursuant to the Act. Otherwise it would be necessary to argue that immediately upon the occurrence of a violation of a law the offender owes the government a particular sum of money and that the action to recover is merely a remedial civil action.

Here, as Mr. Justice Brandeis stated in *McCarthy v. Arndstein*, 266 U.S. 34, 40:

“The government insists, broadly, the constitutional privilege against self incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.”

This action was not brought for the purpose of enriching the government or reimbursing the government for a loss sustained by it—its sole purpose is punishment of the petitioner for violation of the Act. As was said in *United States v. LaFranca*, 282 U.S. 568, 573:

“Admitting that the penalty may be recovered in a civil action, as well as by a criminal prosecution, it is still as a punishment for the infraction of the law. The term ‘penalty’ involves the idea of punishment, and its character is not changed by the mode in which it is inflicted, whether by a civil action or a criminal prosecution.”

If this action was the use of the injunctive process by the Administrator or an action by a consumer against a retailer for reimbursement and additional damages account an overcharge, such would be examples of remedial civil actions—the injunction to protect against future violations and the other to compensate for a past wrong committed against the party seeking to be reimbursed. Neither example fits this case—here the Administrator chose to punish violation of the law by subjecting petitioner to a penalty (of a quasi-criminal nature, according to the *Boyd* case) instead of punishing by a criminal prosecution.

The Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (USC 1934 Ed., Title 49, Sec. 46) has been incorporated continuously in legislative acts since that time—in 17 federal regulatory acts passed in the 10-year period of 1933 to 1943 (according to detail of its history in the *United States v. Monia*, 317 U.S. 424) and its importance in enabling the gov-

ernment to obtain needed information has been so well understood that no attempt to narrow its application or destroy its purpose has been made until now. We sincerely feel that the Circuit Court overlooked the fact that unless this statute means just exactly as its words purport to mean then it does not serve its purpose of making available to the government evidence that otherwise could not be got because of the privilege of silence conferred by the Fifth Amendment prior to enactment of this Act. A congressional policy of over 54 years is in danger of being thrust aside.

We respectfully submit that a reversal of the decisions entered below will not hinder the full and legal enforcement of law; all government enforcement is subject to the same constitutional limitations as have been in effect since the Bill of Rights was added to our Constitution. As stated by Mr. Justice Murphy in *United States v. White*, 322 U.S. 694, 698, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 1251:

“The prosecutors are forced to search for independent evidence instead of relying upon truth extracted from individuals by force of law. The immediate and potential evil of compulsory, self-disclosure transcends any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of crime. While the privilege is subject to abuse and misuse, it is firmly embedded in our constitutional and legal frameworks as a bulwark against iniquitous methods of prosecution. It protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels. . . .”

Since the Administrator in this case has gone beyond the clear limitation imposed by Congress, namely, imposed an action for a penalty based entirely on records produced under the dictate of Congress after a specific claim of privilege against self-incrimination, his action should fail.

CONCLUSION.

It is respectfully submitted that this case is one calling for the exercise by this Court of its supervisory powers in order that an important question of federal law can be settled by this Court and that to such an end a writ of certiorari should be granted and this Court review the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

HAROLD TAFT KING,
Denver, Colorado,
Attorney for Petitioner.

APPENDIX.

The Emergency Price Control Act

(56 Stat. 30, 58 Stat. 637)

(50 U.S.C.A., Appendix 922)

Sec. 202

(b) The Administrator is further authorized, by regulation or order, to require any person who is engaged in the business of dealing with any commodity, or who rents or offers for rent or acts as broker or agent for the rental of any housing accommodations, to furnish any such information under oath or affirmation or otherwise, to make and keep records and other documents, and to make reports, and he may require any such person to permit the inspection and copying of such records and other documents, the inspection of inventories, and the inspection of defense-area housing accommodations. The Administrator may administer oaths and affirmations and may, whenever necessary, by subpoena require any such person to appear and testify or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.

(c) For the purpose of obtaining any information under subsection (a), the Administrator may by subpoena require any other person to appear and testify or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.

(e) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena served upon, any person referred to in subsection (c), the district court for any district in which such person is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the Administrator, shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such person to appear and give testimony or to appear and produce documents, or both; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to any person referred to in subsection (b), and shall be in addition to the provisions of section 4(a).

(g) No person shall be excused from complying with any requirements under this section because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but the immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (U.S.C., 1934 edition, title 49, sec. 46) shall apply with respect to any individual who specifically claims such privilege.

Section 205

(e) If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business may, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation, except as hereinafter provided, bring an action against the seller on account of the overcharge. In such action, the seller shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court, plus whichever of the following sums is the greater:

(1) Such amount not more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or the overcharges, upon which the action is based as the court in its discretion may determine, or (2) an amount not less than \$25 nor more than \$50, as the court in its discretion may determine: Provided, however, that such amount shall be the amount of the overcharge or overcharges or \$25, whichever is greater, if the defendant proves that the violation of the regulation, order or price schedule in question was neither wilfull nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions against the occurrence of the violation. For the purposes of this sanction the payment or receipt of rent for defense-area housing accommodations shall be deemed the buying or selling of a commodity, as the case may be; and the word "overcharge" shall mean the amount by which the consideration exceeds the applicable maximum price. If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, and the

buyer either fails to institute an action under this subsection within thirty days from the date of the occurrence of the violation or is not entitled for any reason to bring the action, the Administrator may institute such action on behalf of the United States within such one-year period. If such action is instituted by the Administrator, the buyer shall thereafter be barred from bringing an action for the same violation or violations. Any action under this subsection by either the buyer or the Administrator, as the case may be, may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction. A judgment in an action for damages under this subsection shall be a bar to the recovery under this subsection of any damages in an other action against the same seller on account of sales made to the same purchaser prior to the institution of the action in which such judgment was rendered.

Compulsory Testimony Act.
(49 U.S.C.A. 47)

§47. Immunity of witness from prosecution; perjury. No person shall be prosecuted or be subject to any penalty for forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under the preceding chapter or any law amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto: *Provided*, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. (Feb. 25, 1903, c. 755, § 1, 32 Stat. 904.)

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1946

No. 833

MARION M. AMATO, INDIVIDUALLY AND DOING BUSINESS AS M. AMATO & SON, PETITIONER

v.

PHILIP B. FLEMING, TEMPORARY CONTROLS ADMINISTRATOR

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the District Court is reported at 60 F. Supp. 361. The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reported at 157 F. 2d 719.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on October 26, 1946 (R. 36). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on December 30, 1946. Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 240 (a) of the

Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a person who, in compliance with an administrative subpoena, produces business records required to be kept by a regulation promulgated by the Administrator, thereby obtains immunity from an action for damages instituted by the Administrator pursuant to section 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.

STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act, as amended (56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632, 50 U. S. C. App., Supp. V, Sec. 901 et seq.), the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (27 Stat. 443, 49 U. S. C., Sec. 46), and Maximum Price Regulation 285 (7 F. R. 10481) are set forth in the Appendix, pp. 10-16.

STATEMENT

On November 4, 1944, a subpoena duces tecum personally signed by the Administrator was addressed to petitioner requiring him to produce specified business records (Exhibit 3, R. 12). On November 9, 1944, petitioner and his counsel appeared and produced the documents required by the subpoena, after stating that the documents were produced involuntarily and under compulsion and after claiming that petitioner was privileged from producing them because they might

incriminate him or subject him to a penalty (R. 20, 21).

On January 20, 1945, the Administrator instituted an action for damages against petitioner under Section 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act. The complaint alleged that petitioner violated Maximum Price Regulation No. 285 in charging prices for bananas aggregating \$831.36 in excess of those established by the Regulation (R. 1-7). Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that the action was precluded by Section 202 (g) of the Emergency Price Control Act and the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (R. 7). He also moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the Administrator pursuant to subpoena on the ground that such evidence was obtained by an illegal search and seizure contrary to the Fourth Amendment (R. 8-10). The district court held that the records required to be produced by subpoena were records required by law to be kept; that under the Fifth Amendment the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to the production of such records; and, therefore, that Section 202 (g) did not confer immunity on petitioner from this action. Accordingly, the court overruled the motion to suppress the evidence (R. 28).

After a pre-trial conference the district court rendered judgment for respondent in the amount

of \$751.37 (R. 29, 30). The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment (R. 36) on the ground stated by the District Court and on the additional ground that the action for damages was civil and remedial and not criminal, and therefore any immunity obtained under the Act did not apply here.

ARGUMENT

No question is presented by petitioner here concerning the Fourth Amendment, or concerning immunity resulting from oral testimony. The sole questions are (1) whether the petitioner's involuntary production of his business records gave rise to immunity under Section 202 (g) of the Act; and (2) if so, whether such immunity was broad enough to bar the Administrator from suing for damages under Section 205 (e).

1. Section 202 (b) of the Act empowers the Administrator, "by regulation or order, to require any person who is engaged in the business of dealing with any commodity * * * to make and keep records and other documents, and to make reports." Pursuant to this authority the Administrator, in Maximum Price Regulation 285 effective December 18, 1942, required (see Appendix, p. 16) every person selling fresh bananas for which maximum prices were established by the regulation to (1) preserve for examination all his records, including invoices, re-

lating to the prices which he charged pursuant to the regulation, (2) prepare and preserve for examination a statement showing his customary allowances, discounts, and other price differentials, and (3) keep and preserve records of the same kind as he had customarily kept, relating to the prices which he charged for fresh bananas after the effective date of the regulation. The records called for by the subpoena and produced by petitioners were "purchase and sales invoices reflecting purchase and sales of fruits and vegetables" from January 1, 1944 to November 4, 1944 (R. 12). Hence, they clearly were required to be kept and preserved by the regulation.

Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, established the principle that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the custodian of records required to be kept by law from their production pursuant to lawful demand, even though they may incriminate the custodian. Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for this Court, said (221 U. S. at 380):

The principle applies not only to public documents in public offices, but also to records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established. There the privilege, which

exists as to private papers cannot be maintained.¹

And see *United States v. White*, 322 U. S. 694, 699; *Rodgers v. United States*, 138 F. 2d 992 (C. C. A. 6); *Pulford v. United States*, 155 F. 2d 944 (C. C. A. 6); *Sims v. United States*, 268 Fed. 234 (C. C. A. 8); *C. M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States*, 12 F. 2d 852 (C. C. A. 8); *Bowles v. Insel*, 148 F. 2d 91 (C. C. A. 3); *Marron v. United States*, 8 F. 2d 251, 255 (C. C. A. 9), affirmed, 275 U. S. 192; *Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co.*, 146 F. 2d 566, 571 (C. C. A. 9), certiorari denied, 325 U. S. 877; *Sargent v. United States*, 35 F. 2d 344 (C. C. A. 9); *Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co.*, 146 F. 2d 744, 779 (C. C. A. 10); Wigmore Evidence (3d Ed. 1940) Sec. 2259c.

Since petitioner had no privilege to refuse production of the records involved, he obtained no immunity under Section 202 (g) of the Act. That section provides that no person shall be excused from complying with any requirement under Section 202 because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but that the immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893, shall apply with respect to any individual who specifically claims such privilege. The pur-

¹ In *Davis v. United States*, decided June 10, 1946, No. 404, Oct. Term, 1945, this Court referred to the *Wilson* case, and held that (slip sheet, p. 8) "where the officers seek to inspect public documents at a place of business where they are required to be kept, permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as where private papers are sought."

pose of this and other immunity statutes was explained as follows by Mr. Justice Holmes in *Heike v. United States*, 227 U. S. 131, 142:

But the obvious purpose of the statute is to make evidence available and compulsory that otherwise could not be got. We see no reason for supposing that the act offered a gratuity to crime. It should be construed, so far as its words fairly allow the construction, as coterminous with what otherwise would have been the privilege of the person concerned.

Accordingly where, as here, no privilege exists at all with respect to particular documents or testimony, no immunity results from their compulsory production. See *Coleman v. United States*, 153 F. 2d 400 (C. C. A. 6); *Bowles v. Seitz*, 62 F. Supp. 773 (W. D. Tenn.).

2. Even if the records produced by petitioner in response to the subpoena were privileged and their production gave rise to an immunity, such immunity would not apply to this action for damages under Section 205 (e). Section 202 (g) of the Act incorporates the immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (49 U. S. C. 46), which provides that no person who has been compelled to produce evidence or testify shall be:

prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any trans-

action, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise * * *.

Clearly, the "penalties" and "forfeitures" referred to in the statute are the same penalties and forfeitures comprehended by the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment. In both cases the penalties and forfeitures involved are criminal: neither includes *civil* penalties and forfeitures. Where a statutory sanction does not have punishment for its sole purpose but is designed to compensate for past wrongs or protect against future injuries, it is not criminal but remedial. *Helvering v. Mitchell*, 303 U. S. 391; *United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess*, 317 U. S. 537. The damages sanction imposed by Section 205 (e) is clearly remedial. Its purpose is primarily to protect the public, and is of a type (i. e., multiple damages) which has traditionally been regarded as remedial. See *United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess*, *supra*, at 549; *Stockwell v. United States*, 13 Wall. 531, 549; *Crary v. Porter*, 157 F. 2d 410, 414 (C. C. A. 8). A separate provision of the Emergency Price Control Act, Section 205 (b), provides a distinctively criminal sanction (fine or imprisonment) for willful violations.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Court below is correct. No conflict of decision appears, and there is no war-

rant for further review. It is respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

✓ GEORGE T. WASHINGTON,
Acting Solicitor General.

WILLIAM E. REMY,
Deputy Commissioner for Enforcement,

✓ DAVID LONDON,
Director, Litigation Division,

SAMUEL MERMIN,
Solicitor, Litigation Division,

WALTER D. MURPHY,
Special Appellate Attorney,
Office of Price Administration,
Office of Temporary Controls.

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APPENDIX

1. Pertinent provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended by the Stabilization Extension Act of 1944 (56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632, 50 U. S. C. App., Supp. V, Sec. 901 et. seq.):

Section 202 (a):

The Administrator is authorized to make such studies and investigations, *to conduct such hearings*,¹ and to obtain such information as he deems necessary or proper to assist him in prescribing any regulation or order under this Act, or in the administration and enforcement of this Act and regulations, orders, and price schedules thereunder.

Section 202 (b):

The Administrator is further authorized, by regulation or order, to require any person who is engaged in the business of dealing with any commodity, or who rents or offers for rent or acts as broker or agent for the rental of any housing accommodations, to furnish any such information under oath or affirmation or otherwise, to make and keep records and other documents, and to make reports, and he may require any such person to permit the inspection and copying of records and other documents, the inspection of inventories, and the inspection of defense-area housing accommodations. The Administrator may administer oaths and affirmations and may, whenever necessary, by subpoena re-

¹ Added by Section 105 (a) of Stabilization Extension Act of June 30, 1944.

quire any such person to appear and testify or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.

Section 202 (c) :

For the purpose of obtaining any information under subsection (a), the Administrator may by subpoena require any other person to appear and testify or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.

Section 202 (d) :

The production of a person's documents at any place other than his place of business shall not be required under this section in any case in which, prior to the return date specified in the subpoena issued with respect thereto, such person either has furnished the Administrator with a copy of such documents (certified by such person under oath to be a true and correct copy), or has entered into a stipulation with the Administrator as to the information contained in such documents.

Section 202 (e) :

In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena served upon, any person referred to in subsection (c), the district court for any district in which such person is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the Administrator, shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such person to appear and give testimony or to appear and produce documents, or both; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to any person referred to in subsection (b), and shall

be in addition to the provisions of section 4 (a).

Section 202 (g):

No person shall be excused from complying with any requirements under this section because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but the immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 49, sec. 46), shall apply with respect to any individual who specifically claims such privilege.

Section 205 (b):

Any person who willfully violates any provision of section 4 of this Act, and any person who makes any statement or entry false in any material respect in any document or report required to be kept or filed under section 2 or section 202, shall, upon conviction thereof, be subject to a fine of not more than \$5,000, or to imprisonment for not more than two years in the case of a violation of section 4 (c) and for not more than one year in all other cases, or to both such fine and imprisonment. Whenever the Administrator has reason to believe that any person is liable to punishment under this subsection, he may certify the facts to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, cause appropriate proceedings to be brought.

Section 205 (e):

If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business may, *within one*

year from the date of the occurrence of the violation, except as hereinafter provided, bring an action against the seller on account of the overcharge. In such action, the seller shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court, plus whichever of the following sums is the greater: (1) Such amount not more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or the overcharges, upon which the action is based as the court in its discretion may determine, or (2) an amount not less than \$25 nor more than \$50, as the court in its discretion may determine: Provided, however, That such amount shall be the amount of the overcharge or overcharges or \$25, whichever is greater, if the defendant proves that the violation of the regulation, order, or price schedule in question was neither wilfull nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions against the occurrence of the violation.¹ For the purposes of this section the payment or receipt of rent for defense-area housing accommodations shall be deemed the buying or selling of a commodity, as the case may be; and the word "overcharge" shall mean the amount by which the consideration exceeds the applicable maximum price.² If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing

¹ As amended by sec. 108 (b) of Stabilization Extension Act of 1944. Formerly read, in place of italicized language:

"* * * bring an action either for \$50 or for treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is the greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court."

² Added by sec. 108 (b) of Stabilization Extension Act of 1944.

a maximum price or maximum prices, and the buyer *either fails to institute an action under this subsection within thirty days from the date of the occurrence of the violation or is not entitled for any reason to bring the action, the Administrator may institute such action on behalf of the United States within such one-year period. If such action is instituted by the Administrator, the buyer shall thereafter be barred from bringing an action for the same violation or violations. Any action under this subsection by either the buyer or the Administrator, as the case may be, may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction. A judgment in an action for damages under this subsection shall be a bar to the recovery under this subsection of any damages in any other action against the same seller on account of sales made to the same purchaser prior to the institution of the action in which such judgment was rendered.*³

2. The Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (27 Stat. 443, 49 U. S. C. 46):

* * * no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing

³ As amended by sec. 108 (b) of Stabilization Extension Act of 1944. Formerly read, in place of italicized language:

"* * * is not entitled to bring suit or action under this subsection, the Administrator may bring such action under this subsection on behalf of the United States. Any suit or action under this subsection may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction, and shall be instituted within one year after delivery is completed or rent is paid. The provisions of this subsection shall not take effect until after the expiration of six months from the date of enactment of this Act."

books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, whether such subpoena be signed or issued by one or more Commissioners, or in any cause or proceeding, criminal or otherwise, based upon or growing out of any alleged violation of the act of Congress, entitled, "An act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or of any amendment thereof on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena; or the subpoena of either of them, or in any such case or proceeding: *Provided*, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying:

Any person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and testify, or to answer any lawful inquiry, or to produce books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents, if in his power to do so, in obedience to the subpoena or lawful requirement of the Commission shall be guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by fine not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than one year or by both such fine and imprisonment.

3. Pertinent provisions of Maximum Price Regulation 285 * (7 F. R. 10481): Paw

§ 1351.1261. *Records and Reports.* (a) Every person selling fresh bananas for which maximum prices are established by this regulation shall:

(1) Preserve for examination by the Office of Price Administration all his records, including invoices or other written evidences of a sale and delivery, relating to the prices which he charges pursuant to the provisions of this regulation.

(2) Prepare on or before December 31, 1942, on the basis of all available information and records, and thereafter keep for examination by any person during ordinary business hours, a statement showing all of his customary allowances, discounts, and other price differentials.

(b) Every person making a sale of fresh bananas for which maximum prices are established by this regulation shall keep and make available for examination by the Office of Price Administration for so long as the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, is in effect, records of the same kind as he has customarily kept relating to the prices which he charges for fresh bananas after the effective date of this regulation and in addition records showing as precisely as possible the basis upon which he determined the maximum prices for fresh bananas.

* This Regulation was effective on December 18, 1942, and remained in force until superseded by Revised Maximum Price Regulation 285 (10 F. R. 1493), effective February 12, 1945.